



Practical Application of Physical Security Criteria

Presented By:

Innovative Engineering Inc.

2014 Joint Engineer Training Symposium

Society of American Military Engineers

South Atlantic/South Central/Carolina

Seminar Overview



- **Innovative Engineering**
- **Background Information**
 - History of Terrorism
 - Risk Assessment (Asset Value, Threats & Vulnerability)
 - Risk Reduction
- **DoD Minimum Anti-Terrorism Standards for Buildings Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC 4-010-01)**
 - Criteria (Civil, Architectural, Structural and MEP)
 - New Tables & Graphics
 - Practical Application (Example Site Walk Thru)

Innovative Engineering Inc.




- **Structural Engineers**
 - Commercial
 - Government
 - Industrial
- **Specialties**
 - Physical Security
 - Forensics



Physical Security



- We Bridge the Gap
- Advanced Training
 - Structural Dynamics
 - Specialized Training
- Services
 - Site Analysis
 - Blast Load Studies
 - Hardening (Blast Design)
 - Progressive Collapse
 - Peer Reviews



Forensics

- Condition Assessments
- Due Diligence Surveys
- Environmental Sampling
- **Façade Inspection**
- Failure Analysis
- **Post-Disaster Damage Assessments**
- **Sidewalk Vaults**



Today's Presenters



- **Scott L Weiland PE**

- Education

- BSCE **University of Michigan**
- Graduate Studies:
 - San Jose State University
 - Georgia Institute of Technology
- Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection Security Engineering: Applied Research Associates
- Design of Blast Resistant Structures: Baker Risk
- Blast Resistance for Anti-Terrorism: Protective Engineering Consultants

- Registration: PE in 15 States + PR

- Experience

- 34 Years in Design and Construction
- 20 Years in ATFP Security Engineering



Today's Presenters



- **Stephen L Morgan EI**
 - Education
 - BSCET, Southern Polytechnic State University
 - Blast Resistance for Anti-Terrorism: Protective Engineering Consultants
 - Registration: EI
 - Experience: 9 Years Security Engineering
 - Expertise
 - ATFP Peer Reviews
 - Blast Design
 - Progressive Collapse



Physical Security Consultant



- **Brian L Dance PE SE**
 - Education
 - BSCE Brigham Young University
 - MSCE Brigham Young University
 - Graduate Studies: Georgia Institute of Technology
 - Design of Blast Resistant Structures: Baker Risk
 - Blast Resistance for Anti-Terrorism: Protective Engineering Consultants
 - Registrations: PE & SE
 - Experience: 8 Years
 - Expertise
 - ATFP Peer Reviews
 - Vehicle Barriers
 - Blast Design
 - Progressive Collapse



Background Information




- **Basic Definitions**
- **History of Terrorism**
- **Risk Assessment (Asset Value, Threats & Vulnerability)**
- **Risk Reduction**

Definitions - Graphical




- Explosive
- Hardening
- Standoff
- Threat



Source: FEMA 426

Progressive Collapse



“The spread of an initial local failure from building element to building element, eventually resulting in the collapse of an entire structure or a disproportionately large part of it.”

Source: UFC 4-010-01

Historical Perspective – Not New



- Historical references over **2000 years** ago.
- 1773, **Boston Tea Party** Lead to Revolutionary War
- 1914, Started **World War I**.



“Boston Tea Party”

- Middle East in the 1950's Source: Luis Arcas Brauner
- Escalated after cold war in 80's & early 90's.
- Viewed as a Third World problem.

Historical Perspective - Recent




- 1978-1995 The Unabomber
- 1993-1st WTC Bombing
- 1995-Oklahoma City Bombing
- 1996-Centennial Olympic Park Bombing
- 2001-2nd WTC Bombing
- 2001-The Shoe Bomber
- 2001-Anthrax Attacks
- 2002-The Beltway Sniper
- 2006-SUV Attack at UNC, Chapel Hill
- 2009-NYC Subway Plot
- 2009-Fort Hood
- 2009 Little Rock Recruiting Office
- 2009-Underwear Bombing Attempt
- 2010- Times Square Bombing Attempt
- 2013-Boston Marathon Bombing



Attacks in US



Total and Fatal Attacks in the United States by Year, 1970 to 2011




- Attacks in US are declining despite global increase.

Source: IUSSD Terrorism Data, LaFree, Gary, Dugan & Miller

Terrorist Attacks Against US




- US accounts for only 7.8% of terrorism worldwide.



Source: The Heritage Foundation, Muhlhausen & McNeil


US Casualties/Attack (2009-1969)



Source: The Heritage Foundation, Muhlhausen & McNeil

- However, attacks against the US tend to cause more casualties/attack.

Attacks against Military



Source: The Heritage Foundation, Muhlhausen & McNeil


- 43% of all attacks against military institutions are leveled against the US.

Weapons Used in U.S. Attacks

1970 - 2011




Firearms,
12.78%



- Explosives
- Incendiary
- Firearms
- Melee
- Sabotage Equipment
- Biological
- Fake Weapons
- Chemical
- Vehicle
- Radiological

Source: IUSDD Terrorism Data, LaFree, Gary, Dugan & Miller


Weapon Trends in U.S. Attacks



Source: IUSSD Terrorism Data, LaFree, Gary, Dugan & Miller

- Less bombing and firearm attacks.
- More Improvised Incendiary Devices and biological attacks.
 - Improvised Incendiary Devices (IID) associated with environmental and animal rights violent extremist groups attacking property.
 - Increase in biological attacks is due to Anthrax Attacks in 2001.


Risk Assessment Process



$$\text{Risk} = \text{Asset Value} \times \text{Threat Rating} \times \text{Vulnerability Rating}$$

Source: FEMA 426

Risk Assessment Process




Risk = Asset Value x Threat Rating x Vulnerability Rating

Source: FEMA 426

Risk Assessment Standard




- DoD Security Engineering Facilities Planning Manual, **UFC-4-020-01**
 - Require Risk Analysis
 - Results in Design Criteria
 - May Reference FOUO Support Standards
 - Or DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, **UFC 4-010-01**




Risk Reduction Criteria



- DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings, **UFC 4-010-01**
 - Minimum Standards
 - Consider Installation Specific Threats



Risk Reduction Basics



- **Concentric Levels of Protection**
- Progressively Reduces Threat

Explosive Threats



- Favorite tactic amongst terrorist
- Ingredients easily obtained
- Easy and quick to detonate
- Vehicles carry large quantities to doorstep.
- Dramatic effect
- Mass injuries and casualties



Murrah Federal Building

Yield (~TNT Equiv.)	4,000 lbs
Reflected Pressure	9,600 psi
Standoff	15 ft
Killed	166


Source: FEMA

Blast Theory




- Supersonic pressure wave caused by detonation
- Similar to water wave including reflections and refractions and reformation

Blast Theory



- Produces tremendous pressures (e.g. > 4 psi, 576 psf) in a short amount of time, milliseconds.
- Produces a small amount of wind ahead of and behind the pressure wave.
- As pressure wave impinges on surface in its path, the pressure buildup, reflected pressure, can be almost 13 times the incident free field pressure wave.


Blast Theory



Source: FEMA 427

- Pressures decay exponentially with time.
- Dynamic, non-linear, time history analysis.

Blast Theory




- Pressures decay with the cube of the distance from the explosion.


Blast Theory – Vehicle Bomb




Envelope Failure



Upward Force
on Floors




Blast Wave
Surrounds
Building



Source: FEMA 427

- Blast breaks windows, lifts floors, fails columns.
- Note positive pressure on all sides of buildings.
- Pressure wave diffracts around object and reforms on the other side.
- Pressures determined by nomograph (Kingery & Bulmash)


Shapes That Affect Blast




Round Shape




Re-entrant corners



Berm



Blast Wall




Overhang

- Re-entrant corners can accentuate blast pressures.
- Round shapes can dissipate pressures.
- Berms are ineffective at reducing blast pressures.
- Blast walls can reduce pressures to incident pressures but could accentuate blast pressures.
- Pressure determination may require CFD .

Source: FEMA 427

Optimum Standoff




- Optimize total cost of Hardening + Land + Perimeter
 - Less stand-off requires more hardening.
 - More stand-off requires more land and perimeter
 - Note Progressive Collapse is threat independent.

DoD Minimum ATFP Criteria



- DoD Design Criteria
- Combination of performance and prescriptive requirements.
- Simplified graphics and tables.





Questions?

Next: Design and Analysis Techniques

Stephen L Morgan EI